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Targeting Individuals Belonging
to an Armed Group
Dr. Gloria Gaggioli*
ABSTRACT
In the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs),
individuals belonging to an organized armed group are generally
considered targetable based on their membership in such a group.
There would be no need to prove that they are directly
participating in hostilities in order to consider their targeting
compliant with international humanitarian law (IHL).
Targeting based on membership thus requires answering two key
questions. First, what is an organized armed group for the
purpose of IHL?; and, second, how should one determine
membership in such a group? These two crucial questions raise a
number of legal and practical challenges, especially with respect
to the contemporary "war on terror" that is being waged by a
number of states against alleged transnational armed groups
such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as well as against so-
called associated forces. In the light of these challenges, there is a
need for further research that is not only legal but also empirical
in order to properly clarify the crucial notions of "organized
armed groups" and "membership" in such groups under IHL.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the prevailing view among IHL specialists and states
is that in an NIAC, 1 members of an organized nonstate armed group
may be targeted and killed in a similar way as members of state armed
forces.2 A minority of authors maintain that members of organized
armed groups may be targeted only when and for such time as they
directly participate in hostilities.3
In other words, members of organized armed groups would
generally be considered targetable based on their membership in such
groups. There would be no need to prove that they are directly
participating in hostilities in order to consider their targeting as
compliant with IHL. Members of organized armed groups would thus
not benefit from the famous "revolving door" of protection in the same
way as civilians-who lose protection against direct attack when they
engage in direct participation in hostilities, but regain it as soon as
such participation ends, such as when they resume their civilian
activities.4
This entails that targeting based on membership in an organized
armed group requires answering two key questions. First, what is an
1. A non-international armed conflict (NIAC) is a conflict opposing a state to an
organized nonstate armed group or an armed conflict between such organized armed
groups. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; see also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No IT-94-1-
AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
2. See NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 27 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH GUIDANCE]; SANDESH
SIvAKuMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 359-62 (2012);
Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC "Direct
Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641, 674-
680 (2010).
3. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-
STATE ACTORS 152 (2010) (nevertheless adopting a wide interpretation of the temporal
aspect of direct participation in hostilities in relation to members of armed groups and
recognizing that the membership approach tends to be the prevailing view); DARAGH
MURRAY, PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 114, ¶ 5.09
(2016).
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, art. 51, ¶ 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 13, T 3; see also
ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 70.
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organized armed group for the purpose of IHL?; and, second, how
should one determine membership in such an organized armed group
for the purpose of targeting? These two crucial questions raise a
number of legal and practical challenges, especially with respect to the
contemporary "war on terror" that is being waged by a number of states
against alleged transnational armed groups such as al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State as well as against so-called associated forces.
This essay will provide an overview of these main practical and
legal challenges in defining organized armed groups and membership
therein in light of the contemporary fight against terrorism (Part II).
Then it will provide an IHL analysis of the notions of "organized armed
group" (Part III) and membership in such groups for the purpose of
targeting (Part IV) and apply such concepts to entities such as al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State and their alleged members. Conclusive
remarks (Part V) will suggest the need for further research that is not
only legal but also empirical in order to properly clarify the crucial
notions of "organized armed groups" and "membership" in such groups
under IHL.
II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN LIGHT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM
Contemporary armed conflicts show that there is a multitude of
armed groups, each with very different characteristics, structures, and
ways of operating. At one end of the spectrum, there are "traditional"
armed groups, such as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the
FARC in Colombia, or the Hezbollah in Lebanon. These groups are
well-organized and have a state army-like structure. They have clear
and distinctive uniforms, which allow recognizing them at a distance.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are amorphous armed groups,
or rather networks, such as al-Qaeda, which continue to rally members
and which seemingly have a common strategy despite their
decentralized character. The Islamic State is a particularly intriguing
organization as it has two faces. It somehow combines a highly-
organized state army-like structure in Iraq and Syria notably, while at
the same time operating as a worldwide network made of various
terrorist cells or individuals operating more or less independently.
Territorial losses in Iraq and Syria lead the Islamic State to adapt and
to operate in a more decentralized manner while at the same time
providing inspiration to followers, or so-called lone wolves, to
perpetrate terrorist attacks far away from the battlefield.5
5. Margaret Coker, Eric Schmitt & Rukmini Callimachi, With Loss of Its
Caliphate, ISIS May Return to Guerrilla Roots, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/middleeast/islamic-state-territory-
attacks.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/98QG-DUNV] (archived Mar.
19, 2018).
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In light of this new reality, an important issue is whether
worldwide terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
(under its second manifestation) may be qualified as transnational
"organized armed groups" for the purpose of IHL. As highlighted by
Eric Talbot Jensen, there are several "complicating factors" to consider
such groups as organized armed groups for the purpose of IHL. 6 They
have no pyramidal structure, but rather decentralized organizational
command and control. The leadership provides general instructions-
guidance more than clear orders or military command-thus leaving a
wide margin of appreciation to those executing the operation. Fighters
are geographically dispersed; cells operate in very different contexts
and those conducting the attack may be far away from the leadership
of the armed group. There are great fluctuations in the functioning of
such networks. Groups in the network split, reunite, change, and
evolve very quickly. Such organizations, and their leadership, might
not precisely know themselves who belongs to them. Such
''complicating factors" are multiplied when taking into account notions
such as "associated forces" or the UN Security Council terminology of
"Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative
thereof."7
In this context, key legal issues are: what do we really mean by'
"organized" armed groups under IHL? Are there key organizational
factors that must be present to consider an armed group as an
"organized armed group" for the purpose of IHL? Should the
organization criterion be assessed on a case-by-case basis in a
particular state or geographical area (i.e., "territorially-based") or may
a group be organized "transnationally" (i.e., irrespective of state
borders)?8 Should groups such as al-Qaeda/Islamic State be seen as
unitary transnational armed groups or rather as associations made of
several armed groups which can be considered "co-belligerents"?
There are also legal and practical challenges in determining
membership in an "organized armed group." Unlike membership in
state armed forces, membership in an organized armed group is
neither defined by domestic law, nor necessarily immediately visible
through the wearing of uniforms.
As a result, a crucial question is: what categories of persons can
be considered members of an organized armed group for the purpose of
targeting? Should a distinction be made between persons belonging to
the military wing versus the political wing? If the answer is
affirmative, what about persons who might cumulate or switch from
6. Eric Talbot Jensen, Targeting of Persons and Property, in THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 55 (2d ed. 2015).
7. Id.; see also, e.g., S.C. Res. 2396 (Dec. 21, 2017).
8. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 18-19 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC
CHALLENGES REPORT].
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"political" to "military" functions? In other words, how should one cope
with the blurring between civilian and military functions of members
of organized armed groups? Moreover, should anyone in the military
wing be considered targetable, including, for instance, the cook, or only
those assuming a "continuous combat function," as purported by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)?9 Even if this
controversial notion were to be accepted, what does it mean concretely
to have a continuous combat function?
Several controversial situations can be raised, especially in the
context of the fight against terrorism. Is receiving training from al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for instance, for conducting a suicide
attack sufficient to establish membership? Is the pledging of allegiance
to the Islamic State, for instance, sufficient? If a terrorist group claims
responsibility for an attack, is it sufficient to consider the attackers
members of the group? What about an individual who merely travels
to Syria with the intent to join, for instance, the Islamic State? Is
he/she to be considered a member of the group and, if yes, when would
membership begin? Is the provision of weapons by a terrorist group to
an individual sufficient to establish membership? Is it possible to
belong to an armed group through virtual relationships on the
internet?
The law does not provide clear-cut answers to these questions, as
will be evidenced in the following sections.
III. THE NOTION OF "ORGANIZED ARMED GROUP" UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Surprising as it may be, IHL does not define the notion of
"organized armed groups," despite the fact that the organization of the
parties is crucial to determine the existence of an NIAC, together with
the criterion of intensity of violence between the parties.
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions does not even
use the term "organized armed group." It simply states that "[i]n the
case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions
... (emphasis added)."1 0 The term "Party" has been interpreted as
entailing the existence of organized actors, be they states or nonstate
actors." The ICRC Commentaries noted, already in 1952, that one
9. See ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 27.
10. First Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention,
supra note 1, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 3; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
11. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST GENEVA
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
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possible criterion to determine the existence of an NIAC is that "the
Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a
determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring
respect for the Convention."1 2
In 1977, Additional Protocol II was adopted and complements
Common Article 3 with additional rules that are applicable in NIACs.
Article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol II provides that it applies
to armed conflicts:
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.1 3
Article 1, paragraph 2 further specifies that it does "not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature ....
Additional Protocol II has a narrower scope of application compared to
Common Article 3 and sets a high threshold with respect to
organization and intensity,'5 notably by requiring territorial control by
the organized armed group.
The case law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has further specified factors to determine
when the criterion of organization is fulfilled.1 6 These factors could be
classified in two broad categories. The first category relates to the
internal structure and includes the existence of a responsible command
capable of exercising authority and direction over the forces in the
accomplishment of the mission; of an organizational chart; and of
internal rules, including disciplinary rules. The second relates to the
operations performed by the group: the ability to recruit and train new
fighters, to control territory, to set up headquarters, and to launch
operations bringing together different units. The ICTY has highlighted
that these factors are neither cumulative criteria, nor a checklist for
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD IT 422, 429 (2d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARIES].
12. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I
FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED
FORCES IN THE FIELD 49 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); see also ICRC COMMENTARIES, supra
note 11, at ¶¶ 422-437.
13. Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 1, 1 1.
14. Id. art. 1, 1 2.
15. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4453
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987); Prosecutor v.
Bo~koski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 1 177 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) [hereinafter Boikoski Trial Judgement].
16. Bo~koski Trial Judgement, supra note 15, IT 194-206.
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demonstrating the existence of the organizational criterion, but rather
useful indicia. In brief, the organizational factor cannot be determined
in abstracto, but requires an analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Interestingly, judicial practice has interpreted the criterion of
organization quite leniently. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in Abella v. Argentina-the famous Tablada case-has
decided that it sufficed for the armed group to be "relatively
organized."" The ICTY, in Prosecutor v. Limaj, for instance, also
adopts a quite flexible approach when it qualifies the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) as an organized armed group despite the fact
that the "organisational structure and the hierarchy of the KLA were
confusing."18 On its part, the ICRC opines that what is required is a
"minimum" or "sufficient" level of organization." State practice is not
extremely clear in this respect. While some states seem prompt to
consider that alleged transnational terrorist networks are organized
armed groups for the purpose of IHL,20 others have been reluctant to
recognize that terrorist groups operating at home are more than
criminal bands, but rather organized armed groups for the purpose of
IHL. 2 1
As evidenced by these various interpretations, the notion of
"organization" is flexible enough to adapt to different types of armed
groups. Not only traditional, hyperhierarchical, pyramidal armed
groups can be considered organized armed groups. There is no one-size-
fits-all definition of such groups. Nevertheless, in order not to deprive
the criterion of "organization" of its meaning, it is worth recalling the
object and purpose of this notion. In other words, some minimum
requirements to establish the existence of the organization criterion
should be deduced from the "why" question.
There are in fact two main reasons why the "organization" of
armed groups is key from an IHL prism. The first reason is to
distinguish proper armed conflicts from "isolated," "sporadic," or
otherwise less serious acts of violence performed by unorganized
17. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/I.95, doc. 7 ¶ 152 (1997).
18. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, T 132 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
19. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term 'Armed Conflict" Defined in
International Humanitarian Law?, at 5 (Mar. 2008); see also ICRC COMMENTARIES,
supra note 11, ¶¶ 423, 429.
20. Consider, for example, the United States' position in relation to Al Qaeda.
Gloria Gaggioli, The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Conduct of Hostilities, Law
Enforcement and Self-Defense, in COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE (Christopher M. Ford & Winston S.
Williams eds., forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Gaggioli COMPLEX BATTLESPACES].
21. As an illustration, consider Russia's position in relation to the Chechen
rebels, or Turkey's position in relation to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). See id.
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criminal bands.22 This requires the ability of the armed group to launch
military operations bringing together different units and to confront
enemy armed forces in the context of proper armed clashes, which is
illusory without proper organization. Several lower level attacks may
give rise to an armed conflict, but there must be a link, a "continuum,"
between various attacks performed by the same group. In other words,
the organization of the armed group is a prerequisite for a sufficient
intensity of violence, which is the second necessary criterion to fulfill
for establishing the xistence of an armed conflict.23
The second reason is to make sure that the group would be able to
respect IHL. 24 To be sure, this does not mean that the group must
respect IHL for the latter to apply. This would be nonsensical because
it would mean that IHL does not apply unless it is respected. Rather,
this means that the group must have the capacity to respect IHL.
Terrorist groups may well be capable of complying with IHL even if the
perpetration of serious violations of IHL is part of their strategy.2 5
What is required is the existence of a certain accountability of the
group for the acts of their members. This "accountability" could exist
even if fighting forces might be given a lot of initiative in the
accomplishment of the mission, but at the very least the armed group,
through a responsible command, must exercise sufficient control of the
acts of their members for such acts to be considered their own.
From the foregoing, there is little doubt, for instance, that the
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq notably corresponds to an organized
armed group. It has been able to mount several sustained attacks and
concerted military action and there is a clear continuum/strategy
behind these attacks. Moreover, it has an internal structure and
disciplinary system which would allow it to ensure respect for IHL if
the responsible command so wished. The same can be said for instance
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
No sufficient evidence has been adduced however to demonstrate
that al-Qaeda or the Islamic State are worldwide unitary transnational
organized armed groups. Were attacks mounted by alleged cells of al-
Qaeda or the Islamic State all around the world part and parcel of a
same "continuum of attacks"? Is there an almighty responsible
command able to supervise attacks and to have control over military
operations globally? Probably not. The mere fact that various neo-
jihadist cells share a common ideology and have loose connections with
one another is not enough to consider that they all together constitute
an organized armed group for the purpose of IHL.
22. See, e.g., Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 1, T 2; ICRC COMMENTARIES, supra
note 11, ¶431.
23. For discussion on the intrinsic links between the criteria of organization and
intensity, see ICRC COMMENTARIES, supra note 11, ¶ 434.
24. See id. ¶T 425, 429; Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 1, ¶ 1.
25. See Bogkoski Trial Judgement, supra note 15, ¶¶ 204-05 (explaining that a
pattern of LOAC violations does not support inference that group is unable to comply).
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Considering al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as single worldwide
organized armed groups is probably a fiction; certainly, a useful one
from some states' perspectives because it facilitates considerably the
classification of situations of violence involving neo-jihadist terrorist
groups and because it enables the applicability of IHL with its more
permissive rules pertaining to targeting and detention of alleged
members of organized armed groups. From a technical-legal
perspective as well as from a humanitarian perspective, however, such
fictions must be unveiled and discarded.
Nevertheless, nothing in IHL indicates that the existence of
organized armed groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in a
particular state or geographical area ("territorially-based") only.2 6 And
to the extent that the Islamic State has operated as a single entity in
the territories of Iraq and Syria, notably, it may certainly be qualified
as a "transnational" armed group.27 It is therefore not impossible for
an organized armed group to operate in numerous states, and allegedly
even without any territorial control, provided that the group is able to
perform attacks of a sufficient magnitude and which are linked with
one another ("continuum of attacks") and that the responsible
command/management exercises a sufficient control over the acts
performed by its members. State borders are therefore not necessarily
key, although it is in practice difficult (but not impossible) to assess the
organization of such groups without adopting a territorial approach.
The terminology used by states, the United Nations, and the
media tends to indicate that global jihadi terrorism takes the shape of
"networks" (i.e., configurations which have no unitary structure but
are made of groups which are loosely linked with one another).
Equating "networks" with "organized armed groups" for the purpose of
IHL, as is too often the case, is an aberration. A subtler, and more
accurate (but equally problematic), way of analyzing this phenomenon
under IHL would be to enquire whether al-Qaeda and Islamic State
global networks can be considered associations made of several armed
groups, which can be considered "allies" or "co-belligerents." This other
way of analyzing the phenomenon gives rise to a whole range of new
legal questions which remain underexplored.
Which level of granularity is needed to determine that a group is
a single organized armed group? If a group splits into two units which
retain links, should we consider these groups two branches of the same
armed group or as two armed groups? Wouldn't too much granularity
render the classification of situations of violence an unsurmountable
26. The ICRC adopts such a case-by-case, territorial approach. See ICRC
CHALLENGES REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
27. Pavle Kilibarda & Gloria Gaggioli, Globalization of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, in THE GREY ZONE: CIVILIAN PROTECTION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE LAWS OF WAR (Mark Lattimer & Philip Sands eds., forthcoming July 2018)
(manuscript at 13).
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task? If a new "cell," for instance a small organized armed group of
thirty people, emerges and joins the network of al-Qaeda, does this
group immediately become a "co-belligerent" even if it has never
conducted an attack on its own?28 What if terrorist cells provide
military support to the wider network, can these cells be considered
belligerent parties involved in a pre-existing NIAC? In other words,
could the "support-based approach" advocated by the ICRC be
considered applicable not only among states but also among nonstate
actors?2 9 Would this not constitute a dangerous slippery slope
insidiously expanding the so-called global war on terror? How should
one justify the acceptance of the "support-based approach" for states
but not for nonstate actors, taking into account the principle of equality
of belligerents? All these issues require further analysis and
conceptualization.
IV. THE NOTION OF "MEMBERSHIP" IN AN ORGANIZED ARMED GROUP
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
While IHL provides a few indications regarding the meaning of
"organized armed groups," the notion of membership in an armed
group for the purpose of targeting is totally absent from IHL treaties.
Additional Protocol II refers to the notion of "direct participation in
hostilities"3 0 but it does not contain a single provision relating to
targeting based on membership in an organized armed group.
The current mainstream interpretation, whereby targeting of
nonstate actors in NIAC is not only based on direct participation in
hostilities but also on membership in an armed group, is the result of
an analogy: if members of state armed forces are always targetable
unless they are hors de combat, it should be the same regarding the
members of nonstate organized armed groups. The principle of equality
of belligerents may be further adduced to support such an
interpretation.
28. See Peter Margulies, Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts:
Crossing Borders and Defining "Organized Armed Group", 89 INT'L L. STUD. 75 (2013)
(justifying the targeting of Al Qaeda's affiliates based on the notion of strategic influence
of Al Qaeda over affiliates). For criticism of the "affiliates" or "co-belligerency" theories,
see generally Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT'L L. 67 (2017) (discussing
the emergence of a reliance on co-belligerency evolving from conflict with Al Qaeda and
other groups). See also Noam Lubell, Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military
Operations against Armed Groups, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 214, 240-43 (2017) (discussing the
rise of the term "co-belligerents" in legal discourse).
29. See generally Tristan Ferraro, The ICRC's Legal Position on the Notion of
Armed Conflict Involving Foreign Intervention and on Determining the IHL Applicable
to This Type of Conflict, 97 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1227 (2015) (discussing the ICRC's
legal position and the theory that support provided by a third power makes the latter a
party to a pre-existing armed conflict).
30. Protocol II, supra note 1, art. 13, [ 3.
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Now, if we accept this (not uncontroversial) analogy,3 1
membership in an armed group for the purpose of targeting could be
understood in three different ways: based on conduct, status, or
function.
1) Should membership be a notion that is attached only to
individuals whose conduct is to "continuously" directly participate in
hostilities? If that were the case, the added value of the notion of
"membership" compared to "direct participation in hostilities" would be
greatly reduced. It is submitted that if membership entirely depends
on actual conduct, this notion becomes useless and should simply be
abandoned. In other words, if targeting.based on "membership" has to
mean something, it has to be more permissive than just direct
participation in hostilities. According to the ICRC,
this approach [i.e., considering that membership in armed groups is simply a
continuous form of civilian direct participation in hostilities] would seriously
undermine the conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the
principle of distinction, most notably because it would create parties to non-
international armed conflicts whose entire armed forces remain part of the
civilian population.
3 2
2) Should membership be based on status? From an IHL perspective,
members of organized armed groups (also called fighters) precisely
have no right to participate directly in hostilities and therefore no
combatant immunity and no prisoner of war status if captured.3 3 From
an international law perspective, status is definitely not an
appropriate concept or wording to define membership in an armed
group. Status could however be understood more broadly as everyone
who is considered a member of the group from the armed group's
perspective.34 In some instances, armed groups keep lists of their
members and develop organigrams. These documents could constitute
evidence of membership. Such an approach (at least if adopted as the
single definition of membership) is, however, objectionable under two
limbs: first, it may be extremely difficult for belligerents to know who
is a member of the group they are fighting against, unless they wear a
distinctive sign; second, it would be particularly formalistic to only rely
on the armed group's subjective appraisal of membership. As indicated
by ex post acknowledgment of attacks by groups such as the Islamic
31. See LUBELL, supra note 3, at 152 (discussing the controversy surrounding
the notion of "continuous combat function"); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 114, T 5.09 (saying
that under IHL for NIAC "all individuals are protected from direct attack, 'unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'").
32. ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 27-28.
33. The discussions preceding the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions clearly demonstrate that states did
not want to afford privilege or iinmunity from prosecutions to members of organized
armed groups. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of
Internal Armed Conflict, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 219, 244 (2011).
34. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 2, at 360 (referring to the notion of "de jure
membership").
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State, for instance, armed groups might have various incentives to
exaggerate their membership. True, regarding state armed forces, one
relies on the state's definition of its armed forces, but domestic law
supports this characterization and, to that extent, membership
remains the result of a legal appreciation and is not merely subjective.
3) The last option is to rely on the notion of function. As a member
of an organized armed group, an individual is given a specific function
or role in such a group. But not every function in a nonstate party to a
conflict should suffice to allow targeting. Clearly, membership for the
purpose of targeting implies that the individual has a function in the
armed wing of the nonstate party to a conflict. Belonging to the political
or humanitarian wings of a nonstate party, in the same way as
belonging to the political apparatus of a state, does not turn an
individual into a military objective for the purpose of IHL. 3 5 In the
practice of armed groups, it is not rare that some members hold both
civilian and military functions. In other words, the lines between
military and civilian functions are blurred. If there is overlap between
the two functions, a possible solution would be to examine which is the
predominant function, although this determination might not always
be evident from the facts. Regarding members who are switching roles,
a solution might be to determine the function of the individual at the
moment of targeting. In any case, completely removing the distinction
between the civilian wings of an armed group and the military wings
on the grounds that it is increasingly difficult to make such a
distinction is a slippery slope that might lead to the targeting of actual
civilians.
An additional question is how to define who constitutes the
military wing of a nonstate party to a conflict (i.e., who constitutes the
organized armed group sensu stricto). The ICRC has been the first to
attempt to conceptualize this notion of membership in an organized
armed group. It developed the notion of "continuous combat function"
and held that the "decisive criterion for individual membership in an
organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous
function for the group involving his or her direct participation in
hostilities."36 In other words, this definition excludes individuals who
support an organized armed group, but whose function does not involve
direct participation in hostilities, such as "recruiters, trainers,
financiers and propagandists"3 7 or those in charge of "purchasing,
smuggling, manufacturing and maintaining of weapons and other
equipment outside specific military operations or to the collection of
intelligence other than of a tactical nature."3 8 A famous example is the
situation of the organized armed group's cook. This person is not to be
considered targetable in the ICRC's view. Some have criticized this
35. See ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 32.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 35.
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approach by submitting that it would be unfair and contrary to the
principle of equality of belligerents since a cook (or anyone else with a
support function) incorporated in state armed forces is targetable,
while his or her homologue belonging to a nonstate party to a conflict
would be protected against attacks (unless and for such time as he/she
directly participates in hostilities).39 Nevertheless, to the extent that
the military necessity of targeting cooks and other individuals with
support functions is nonexistent (or at least very much reduced), the
approach adopted by the ICRC in this respect seems reasonable.
The ICRC notion of continuous combat function is not, however,
as restrictive as one might think. It does not only include individuals
who are actually fighting or involved in the execution of attacks. It
involves also individuals in charge of planning attacks or commanding
acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities. Any function that
involves direct participation in hostilities as part of the group is
sufficient to establish membership in the organized armed group.40
The continuous notion in "continuous combat function" may also
be confusing. The continuous character of the function is not related to
combat activities. The ICRC Guidance on direct participation in
hostilities highlights that "[a]n individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in
hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous
combat function even before he or she first carries out a hostile act."41
Thus, for instance, a person trained and hired to conduct a single
suicide attack can be considered as having a continuous combat
function even before the attack, and the fact that the attacker would in
all likelihood die during his first attack has no bearing on the
continuity of his function in the group. Duration of membership is not
required. What matters is continuity regarding membership, which
merely means that the person that has been given a specific function
in the group has not disengaged from his/her fighting function.4 2 The
member must become part of a group and his/her acts are not
performed outside the organization in a sporadic or unorganized
manner.
Assuming that the notion of continuous combat function and its
theoretical conceptualization as proposed by the ICRC were to be
generally accepted, a problem remains: how concretely may states and
other external actors determine in practice that a person has assumed
a particular function in an organized armed group? Which factors, or
factual elements, need to be taken into account and/or fulfilled to
39. Watkin, supra note 2, at 676.
40. See ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 34.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 28 (interpreting Article 3's requirement that members of armed forces
are considered as "taking no active part in the hostilities", and therefore protected, once
they have disengaged from their fighting function by "hav[ing] laid down their arms" or
once they are placed hors de combat).
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establish functional membership in the absence of clear intelligence to
that effect?
In this respect, few responses can be found in the ICRC Guidance
(which appears at times contradictory4 3) as well as in legal scholarship.
State practice on this remains largely classified, although publicly
available information, regarding the targets of drone strikes for
instance, tends to indicate that membership for the purpose of
targeting is sometimes understood very broadly. Certainly, a case-by-
case approach is required and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to
establish functional membership. Nevertheless, the notion deserves to
be further delimited and framed. At a minimum, it has to be
highlighted that mere ideological bounds with an organized armed
group cannot be equated with functional membership. More broadly,
functional membership shall not rely on subjective factors, but on
objectively verifiable ones only. The notion of functional membership
should also be understood as requiring that an individual has been
given a mission ex ante and that this individual has assumed it. It
somehow requires a "contractual" relationship (whether free or
coerced) involving both the group and recruit. In other words, the mere
pledging of allegiance by an individual to an organized armed group
should not be considered sufficient without more to establish
functional membership. In the same vein, ex post ackhowledgment by
an organized armed group of isolated and sporadic acts of violence
should not be sufficient to establish membership, at least retroactively
(unless they are unequivocal and unqualified).44
The standard of proof required to allow targeting based on
functional membership should also be sufficiently high. In this respect,
the notion of "pattern of life" that is being used in the context of so-
called signature strikes is worrying.45 The mere facts, for instance, for
43. The ICRC DPH Guidance devotes just one paragraph on how to identify
functional membership in practice. Id. at 35. Strangely enough, it mentions that "[a]
continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of uniforms,
distinctive signs, or certain weapons. Yet it may also be identified on the basis of
conclusive behaviour, for example where a person has repeatedly directly participated in
hostilities in support of an organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such
conduct constitutes a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or
temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation." Id. Wearing a
uniform is taken as an indication of membership irrespective of the function performed
in the group. The "conclusive behaviour" seems to be closer to a conduct-based
understanding of membership rather than functional membership. In other words, none
of the examples provided actually relate to function. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 2, at
362 (criticizing the ICRC DPH Guidance and highlighting possible contradictions in this
document).
44. For more information, see the commentary to Article 11 of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
fifty-third session, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 32, 52-54, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
45. U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 174, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18,
2013) [hereinafter U.N. Protection of Human Rights].
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individuals to stay a few days in terrorist guest houses, to entertain
family links or friendships with several persons belonging to an
organized armed group, to live in certain areas controlled by organized
armed groups, or to visit certain places (e.g., extremist mosques)
should in no way be considered sufficient evidence to allow targeting
based on membership. Such vague circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient in the context of security detention as a preventative
measure and with a view notably to gather further information, but
not for targeting.
It is also concerning that notions of "association" with terrorist
groups, widely used for instance in the framework of UN counter-
terrorism sanctions and in the domestic criminal law spheres, seem to
be indiscriminately copy-pasted and transposed in IHL for the purpose
of targeting. In brief, the notion of membership in an organized armed
group for the purpose of targeting has to be even more narrowly defined
than membership in an organized armed group as a justification for
security detention or membership/association with a terrorist group for
the purpose of criminal prosecution or international sanctions. Even
an episodic attack by a particular individual is not evidence of
functional membership, but should rather be seen as an instance of
direct participation in hostilities.
A relevant piece of evidence to establish functional membership in
an organized armed group for the purpose of targeting may include
information to the effect that the organized armed group has provided
training to an individual in relation to direct participation in hostilities
as part of the group, that the organized armed group has- provided
weapons to an individual, that it has selected targets that the
individual should strike, or otherwise that it has helped an individual
to plan an attack. Some of these elements may arguably be carried out
even through web relationships.
Lastly, it should be recalled that even when an individual can be
held to have a continuous combat function, this does not necessarily
mean that this person is targetable whenever and wherever the person
is located. Consider, for instance, the case of a French so-called foreign
terrorist fighter who travels to Syria and is trained in conducting
terrorist attacks in Islamic State camps. May he or she be targeted
when he or she travels back to France or to a neighboring state, such
as Switzerland? The geographical scope of application of IHL needs to
be taken into account. This issue remains highly controversial, but the
ICRC's approach, which is probably the most protective, is that IHL
applicability is limited to the territory controlled by the belligerent
parties (which in our scenario includes France, but not Switzerland).46
46. ICRC Challenges Report, supra note 8, at 22; Jelena Pejic, Extraterritorial
Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications, Int'l Comm. Red Cross,
at 31-39 (May 7, 2015). Contra Nils Melzer, European Parliament, Human Rights
Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare 21 (2013) ("Once
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In Switzerland, thus, force against the "foreign fighter" may only be
used in accordance with the human rights law enforcement paradigm.
But even on the territory controlled by the belligerent parties
(here France), a targeted killing operation would appear to most
military commanders as completely excessive and inadequate and
certainly difficult to justify in front of a court such as the European
Court of Human Rights. Two legal justifications may be adduced to
reach the conclusion that the "foreign fighter" may not be targeted and
killed. A first legal reasoning would be to rely on the famous
Recommendation IX of the ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in
Hostilities on the notions of military necessity and humanity as
additional legal principles under IHL, which may further constrain the
conduct of hostilities in relation to any person who is a priori a
legitimate target under IHL.4 7 Another possibility would be that-for
some reason (which deserves to be better elaborated)-human rights
law would prevail over IHL in such a specific scenario.48 These issues
remain highly disputed as evidenced by the clarification process led by
the ICRC on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts,49 but it is to be hoped
that whatever the legal reasoning adopted, capture/arrest operations
are preferred in such cases:
V. CONCLUsIVE REMARKS-FURTHER CLARIFICATION THROUGH A
LEGAL-EMPIRICAL APPROACH?
The criterion of organization of armed groups, together with the
criterion of intensity, is crucial for the classification of a situation of
violence as an NIAC. In terms of targeting, it is also increasingly
admitted that members of organized armed groups are legitimate
targets because of their membership in an organized armed group.
However, the criteria of organization for the purpose of defining armed
groups under IHL and the notion of membership in such groups are
not clearly defined under international law. In light of contemporary
armed conflicts involving particular types of entities, such as
transnational terrorist networks or transnational criminal gangs,
these notions of organization and membership deserve to be further
clarified or even revisited.
the objective criteria for the existence of an armed conflict are met, the applicability of
humanitarian law is not territorially delimited but governs the relations between the
belligerents irrespective of geographical ocation."); Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial
Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 77, 99 (2013) (discussing the possible negative effects of a rule that does
not allow States to target individuals in a non-belligerent territory).
47. See ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 77-82.
48. For further exploration of this issue, see generally Gaggioli COMPLEX
BATTLESPACES, supra note 20.
49. See generally GLORIA GAGGIOLI, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT
MEETING: THE USE OF FORCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS: INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CONDUCT
OF HosTILITIEs AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGMS (2013).
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A classical interpretation of IHL based on the text, context, object,
and purpose of IHL treaties as suggested above is useful and necessary
but may be insufficient. It should be complemented by a robust
empirical analysis aimed at better understanding the structure and
functioning of contemporary entities such as transnational terrorist
networks, which are often assumed to be organized armed groups for
the purpose of IHL without much elaboration. Comparing such groups
with more traditional organized armed groups (such as the LTTE)
based on some key organizational factors that have already been
identified based notably on the jurisprudence of international criminal
tribunals5 0 may further help to identify differences and commonalities
between such entities and to draw the line between those that may be
deemed sufficiently organized for the purpose of IHL and those which
are not. Empirical methods such as a Social Network Analysis, which
aims at analyzing the types of links between certain
individuals/entities, may further contribute to such an understanding.
It would also be immensely useful to analyze and compare the
practice of several states in order to understand how they determine
the existence of an organized armed group and, most importantly, how
they establish membership in such groups. Obviously, a
methodological issue in this respect is the classified character of much
of this information and a number of commentators have already
criticized this lack of transparency, which may at times be excessive
and not entirely justified by security considerations.5 1 For instance,
states could indicate the types of factors taken into account to establish
membership in an organized armed group without endangering their
military operations. In any case, many relevant indications can already
be deduced from publicly available information in relation, for
instance, to the targets of drone strikes.
A legal-empirical approach is needed to clarify key concepts of
IHL, such as organization of and membership in armed groups, and
therefore to enhance the legal analysis under IHL. Such approaches-
based on the realities of armed groups and state practice-may also
ensure that exercises aimed at clarifying the law are realistic and
operationally relevant and not merely the fruit of elaborated legal
constructs that are disconnected from reality. Contemporary armed
conflicts have shown that when the definitions of key legal concepts
such as "direct participation in hostilities" or "continuous combat
function" remain disputed and/or difficult to operationalize, military
circles tend to replace them with other (inappropriate) concepts, such
as self-defense, which may (wrongly) appear more straightforward.5 2
Reaching consensus on such important IHL concepts should thus be a
priority for the international community.
50. See Boikoski Trial Judgment, supra note 15, IT 194-206.
51. See U.N. Protection of Human Rights, supra note 45, TT 41-50.
52. Gaggioli COMPLEX BATLESPACES, supra note 20.

